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Abstract
This article discusses the effect of the registration requirements under the Zambian
Companies Act on the rules for determining priority among company charges in
Zambia. In light of the Supreme Court decision in Zambia National Commercial
Bank Ltd v Mwila, the article also analyses the scope for applying common law
rules on the ranking of charges, vis-à-vis section 101 of the Companies Act.
INTRODUCTION
The statutory registration scheme introduced by section 101 of the Zambian
Companies Act 1994 (the Companies Act)1 was meant to simplify the complex
legal rules pertaining to priority among charges. In so far as it reaffirms the
rule that “the first in time prevails” the section restates the common law.
However, it amends the common law to the extent that priority is now estab-
lished by the time of registration. This is now true even among charges in
respect of which the equities previously may not have been equal. This legal
provision has not completely replaced the common law. It is therefore impor-
tant to examine the extent to which the nature of any given charge, such as
whether it is a floating, fixed or other charge, is still relevant to establishing
priority in light of the registration requirements under the Companies Act.2
* Lecturer, Brunel Law School, Brunel University, West London, UK; Solicitor, Supreme
Court of England and Wales; Advocate, High Court for Zambia and Supreme Court of
Zambia.
1 Chap 388 of the Laws of Zambia (1995 edition (revised)).
2 For detailed and further reading on charges, see WJ Gough Company Charges (3rd ed,
2007, Lexis Nexis Butterworths); J Getzler and J Payne (eds) Company Charges: Spectrum
and Beyond (2006, Oxford UP); R Calnan Taking Security: Law and Practice (2006, Jordan
Publishing); G McCormack Registration of Company Charges (2nd ed, 2005, Jordan
Publishing); “The floating charge and the Law Commission consultation paper on regis-
tration of security interests” (2003) Insolvency Lawyer 2–13; JH Farrar “Floating charges and
priorities” (1974) 38 The Conveyancer 315; “The availability of the floating charge as a
security device in the United States” (1928) 28(3) Columbia Law Review 360–66; Law
Commission of England and Wales “Registration of security interests: Company charges
and property other than land law” (consultation paper no 164, June 2002). The Law
Commission recommended that the scheme for registering charges under the
Companies Act 1985 should be replaced with a more comprehensive legislative scheme
which would eliminate the need to register a charge over land at the Companies
Registry, rendering registration at the Land Registry sufficient.
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Section 101(1) of the act provides that: “Subject to any consent (express or
implied) given by the person who would otherwise be entitled to priority,
charges required by this Part to be registered shall have priority in relation
to one another in accordance with the times at which they were lodged.”
In Re Sapco Fibreboard & Wood Products Ltd (in receivership),3 an application
was made for directions pursuant to section 113 of the Companies Act for
the High Court to determine the ranking of two competing charges. The
first was a debenture over all movable assets of the company, while the second
was a specific charge on plant, machinery and motor vehicles. The debenture
was registered earlier than the specific charge. One of the arguments made at
the hearing was that section 101(1) was some sort of “first-among-equals” pro-
vision which only applied where the charges involved were of the same class,
for example where both are either floating charges or fixed charges. The court
refused to abide by this logic and stated that section 101(1) is very clear in its
terms and, as provided for in subsection 2, is inapplicable only where priority
of charges is determinable in accordance with the provisions of another sta-
tute. The court also observed that section 101(1) could not be ousted by the
application of common law rules on the ranking of charges. Therefore, a float-
ing charge which was registered earlier under the act could not be outranked
by a debenture creating a charge on plant and machinery.4
In Zambia National Commercial Bank Ltd v Mwila, the Supreme Court observed
that “section 101 is self-explanatory in creating priority among the charges
required to be registered under … the Companies Act”.5 The court held that
this provision did not apply to a mortgage created through the surrender of
title deeds. This raises the question as to which rules are applicable for
those charges not required to be registered. Also, how would priority be deter-
mined in a situation where a non-registrable security is in conflict with a
charge that has been registered under the Companies Act? Would the nature
of the charges involved have any bearing on the outcome, as is the case at com-
mon law? This article attempts to shed some light on these issues.
NATURE OF FLOATING CHARGES
In Attorney General v Zambia Sugar Co Ltd and Nakambala Estate Ltd it was held
that “a floating charge operates as an immediate and continuing charge on
the property charged and has the effect of charging all the property in the
hands of the borrower at the date of the charge”.6 The real and intended effect
3 Re Sapco Fibreboard & Wood Products Ltd (in receivership) – An Application for Directions under
s 113 of Cap 388 2001=HPC=0225 (unreported) per Chulu J.
4 In the end, the court held that it was the parties’ intention, as evidenced by specific refer-
ences in the security documents, that the debenture and floating charge should rank
equally.
5 SCZ appeal no 94 of 1999 (unreported) (11 November 1999 and 6 April 2000) per Ngulube CJ.
6 Attorney General v Zambia Sugar Co Ltd and Nakambala Estate Ltd (1977) ZR 273 (SC) at 273
per Gardner, acting DCJ.
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remains suspended until the occurrence of some future event. This ordinarily
allows the company to deal with and dispose of the charged asset in the mean-
time. Before it has crystallized, a floating charge is simply an equitable secur-
ity.7 The decision in Zambia Sugar endorsed the formulations of Lord
Macnaghten on the nature and effect of a floating charge, the first of which
was pronounced in Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Co v
Manila Rly Co Ltd, to the effect that:
“A floating security is an equitable charge on the assets for the time being of a
going concern. It attaches to the subject charged in the varying condition in
which it happens to be from time to time. It is the essence of such a charge that
it remains dormant until the undertaking ceases to be a going concern, or until
the person inwhose favour the charge is treated intervenes. His right to intervene
may of course be suspended by agreement. But if there is no agreement for
suspension, he may exercise his right whenever he pleases after default.”8
The second formulation was enunciated in Illingworth v Houldsworth, where
Lord Macnaghten stated:
“I should have thought there was not much difficulty in defining what a float-
ing charge is in contrast to what is called a specific charge. A specific charge
I think, is one that without more fastens on ascertained or definite property
or property capable of being ascertained and defined, a floating charge, on
the other hand, is ambulatory and shifting in its nature, hovering over and
so to speak floating with the property which it is intended to affect until
some event occurs which causes it to settle and fasten on the subject of the
charge within its reach and grasp.”9
As already mentioned, a floating charge does not prevent a company from
carrying on its business in the ordinary way.10 Generally, this means that a
company could even charge its property further in an attempt to secure
more funds by way of mortgage or lease.11 The company is at liberty to dispose
7 Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed, Butterworths) vol 16, para 780.
8 (1897) AC 81 at 86, HL.
9 (1904) AC 355 at 358, HL.
10 See Romer LJ in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd (1903) 2 Ch 284 at 295, CA. Also,
see JR Lingard Bank Security Documents (3rd ed, 1993, Butterworths) at 155, stating that: “It
is of the essence of a floating charge that the company has apparent authority to deal
with its assets in the ordinary course of business unless a third party has actual notice
of restrictions which preclude this. It does not have authority to undertake transactions
outside the ordinary course of business (such as to hive down its assets) and any such
transactions if the third party has notice of the irregularity will be subject to the floating
charge.”
11 Wheatley v Silkstone and Haigh Moor Coal Co (1885) 29 Ch D 715 per North J, where amortgage
made “in the ordinary course of business and for the purpose of the business” was found
to be “a good mortgage upon and a good charge upon the property comprised in it”,
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of the property charged through sale or exchange, provided that the future
event by which the floating charge is caused to settle on the charged property
has not taken place. It is commonplace to find restrictions within the charging
document with regard to the company’s future dealings. Also, the company’s
authority to deal with its assets in the ordinary course of business may be cur-
tailed where a third party has actual notice of restrictions which prohibit such
dealing.12 Ultimately, whether or not a charge is a floating charge is a question
of fact to be determined by the court.
PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
Perfection consists in the taking of certain required steps, beyond mere attach-
ment, to make a security interest enforceable against a debtor, and also to
make it effective against third parties.13 In the case of the latter, it is often
necessary to perform an act which puts third parties on notice of the security
interest.14 This additional step is designed to give notice of the security inter-
est to the world and any would-be purchaser or encumbrancer of the secured
asset. Taking constructive or actual possession and registration or filing will
suffice to give notice to the world and third parties generally.15
Possession of security was developed at common law. It is the safest method of
perfection as it puts all those dealingwith a debtor, ofwhompossession has been
divested, on inquiry and is thus as good as notice to the world at large.16
Registration (or filing), on the other hand, is a creature of statute. It is an impor-
tantmodeofperfection for sometypes of security interests. Although these terms
are often used interchangeably, it ismore appropriate to refer to “registration” as
the lodgement ofparticulars relating to the security and “filing” as the lodgement
of the security instrument itself or a copy of it.17 However, it is common for some
statutes merely to refer to “registration” of documents18 and, as such, this article
uses the terms interchangeably unless specified otherwise.
contd
and thus “not subject to the claim created by [a] debenture… intended to be a general float-
ing security over all the property of the Company”.
12 Lingard Bank Security Documents, above at note 10 at 156.
13 R Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2nd ed, 1997, Sweet & Maxwell) at 419–21.
14 Id Commercial Law (3rd ed, 2004, Penguin) at 647.
15 Id at 648.
16 Ibid, stating additionally that, where “a security interest is otherwise unperfected”, it
may “be perfected vis-à-vis a particular third party by notice to that party or by knowl-
edge aliunde [of that other party] on his part”.
17 Report of the Committee on Consumer Credit (1971, HMSO, cmnd 4696) para 5.7.13 (chaired
by Lord Crowther). According to Roy Goode, “[t]he distinction is of substance, for the fil-
ing of a security instrument or copy is public notice of its contents, whereas according to
the orthodox view registration of particulars of the security interest constitutes notice
only of the existence of the security and of the other particulars registered”: Goode
Commercial Law, above at note 14 at 650, n 25 and 664.
18 See sec 4 of the Lands and Deeds Registry Act, cap 185 of the Laws of Zambia.
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REGISTRATION OF CHARGES
The two schemes for registration of charges referred to here are those pro-
vided by the Lands and Deeds Registry and the Companies Registry.19
Section 4(1) of the Lands and Deeds Registry Act states:
“Every document purporting to grant, convey or transfer land or any interest
in land, or to be a lease or agreement for lease or permit of occupation of
land for a longer term than one year, or to create any charge upon land,
whether by way of a mortgage or otherwise, or which evidences the satisfaction
of any mortgage or charge, and all bills of sale of personal property whereof
the grantor remains in apparent possession … must be registered within the
times hereinafter specified in the Registry or in a District Registry: Provided
that if a document creating a floating charge upon land has been registered
under the [relevant] provisions of the Companies Act, or the Co-operative
Societies Act, it need not be registered under the provision of this Part unless
and until such charge has crystallized or become fixed.”20
The requirement for registration under this provision was considered in
Mwila. The key issue in this case was whether a prior equitable mortgage
held by an individual to whom the deeds of title had been surrendered, or
a later floating charge made in favour of a bank to secure an overdraft, took
priority.21 The floating charge was created in July 1997 and crystallized with
the appointment of a receiver in March 1998. It was registered at both the
Lands and Deeds Registry and the Companies Registry. The court held that,
19 Company charges over land which may be registrable under legislation such as the
Agricultural Credits Act (cap 224), Co-operative Societies Act no 20 of 1998 or the
Trades Charges Act (cap 145) must also be registered under the Companies Act. Note
that, where another statute provides rules for determining priority among charges,
the rules under the Companies Act do not apply.
20 Cap 185 of the Laws of Zambia.
21 Compare with Re Castell & Brown Ltd [1898] 1 Ch 315, which involved equitable encum-
brances in the form of debentures and an equitable mortgage by deposit of deeds
which, though subsequent in date to the debentures, was taken without notice of the
debentures. The case held that the bank which held the deeds of title had a stronger
equity than the debenture holders and was thus entitled to priority. Also see Perry
Herrick v Attwood (1857) 2 De G & J 21, where a mortgagee left the title deeds to the mort-
gaged property with the mortgagor, so that the mortgagor could obtain a further mort-
gage on the same property. It was agreed that the second mortgage would have priority
to the first. In fact, the mortgagor obtained two further mortgages and eventually
defaulted on all of them. The first mortgagee claimed that his mortgage had priority
over at least the third mortgage, if not the second, because it was the earliest and had
been created by deposit of title deeds. The court held, however, that the mortgagee
had lost his priority by his careless handling of the deeds; as Lord Crownworth LC
said: “To hold that a person who advances money on an estate, the title deeds of
which are under such circumstances left in the hands of the mortgagor, is not to
have preference, would be to shut our eyes to the plainest equity.”
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since the equitable mortgage in this case was by way of deposit of title deeds,
there was accordingly no document required to be registered under the Lands
and Deeds Registry Act.
The Companies Act creates two methods for registering charges. The
company is required to maintain its own register where particulars must be
entered of all charges over its property.22 This register is open for inspection
by any member of the public for a fee, while members of the company, its
creditors and the Registrar of Companies or his designated agents can make
searches for free. The registrar also keeps a register of particulars of all charges
affecting the property or undertaking of every company.23 Any “floating
charge on the whole or part of the undertaking or property of the company”
is required to be registered within 21 days of the date on which the charge is
created or acquired, as the case may be.24
Effect of registration
If a charge which requires registration is not registered, the company, and
every officer in default, is liable to a fine.25 Section 99(11) of the Companies
Act also provides that:
“If the particulars and documents relating to a charge that are required by this
section to be lodged with the Registrar are not lodged within the time required:
(a) the charge shall be void against the liquidator and any creditor of the
company; and
(b) the full debt secured by the charge shall become payable immediately
by the company.”26
InMwila it was emphasized that these provisions only apply to companies and
not to an individual with a claim over company property. The court stated that
the statutory obligation and duty to comply with registration requirements
fall on the company, especially in light of section 99(11) which stipulates the
consequences of failure to register a charge that is required to be registered.
In this regard the consequences for non-registration put the interests of credi-
tors ahead of the company’s interests. However, this does not paint the com-
plete picture as it ignores the consequences for non-registration in relation to
the conflicting claims of third parties. Clearly, an unregistered interest is
22 Companies Act, sec 97(2).
23 Id, sec 98(1).
24 Id, secs 99(1)(d) and (2)(b).
25 Id, sec 97(4).
26 Also, note that sec 348 provides: “A floating charge on the undertaking or property of the
company created within twelve months before the commencement of the winding-up
shall, unless it is proved that the company immediately after the creation of the charge
was solvent, be invalid except to the amount of any cash paid to the company at the
time, or subsequently, in consideration for the charge, together with interest on that
amount at the rate fixed by the terms of the charge.”
REGISTRAT ION AND RANKING OF COMPANY CHARGES 
invalid against subsequent secured creditors and the liquidator.27 The objec-
tive of registration as reflected in the sanctions provided in section 99(11) is
to give notice “of a specific security interest so as to bind third parties acquir-
ing rights over the assets given as security, and thereby preserve the secured
creditors’ priority”.28 This raises two sets of issues over the decision in
Mwila, namely the exemption from registration of a mortgage created by
deposit of documents of title and the onus to register.
The first is summed up by Roy Goode when he states that, due to the nature
of “the criteria for registrability of an interest and the sanction for non-
registration … [t]he result is that in order to preserve the validity of his secur-
ity vis-à-vis third parties the creditor is required to register it in the Companies
Registry even where it is a possessory security (eg, a mortgage protected by
deposit of the title deeds) or is registrable in some other, specialist, register,
such as the Lands Registry”.29 Goode was expressing dissatisfaction with
some equivalent provisions (namely sections 399(3) and 395(1)) of the UK
Companies Act 1985 to the effect that: “Since the object of registration is to
give notice of the security interest to third parties, failure to register ought
not in principle affect the enforceability of the security against the debtor
himself”.30 In other words, the mismatch between the requirement to register
and the sanction imposed for failure to do so has far reaching consequences
for those on whom the legal obligation to register does not rest.
The second point follows from this conclusion. It is clear that, according to
statute, the onus to register falls on the company.31 However, the creditors
owe it to themselves to protect their interests through registration at the
Companies Registry in order to preserve the validity and priority of their secur-
ity. In this regard, registration, which is not merely a perfection requirement,
is the duty of the person taking the charge. It is of no help to a creditor to
allege failure to register on the part of the company when the legal sanction
imposed for non-registration at the latter’s behest is merely a fine. It is impor-
tant to understand though that this scenario is in accord, and as such can be
reconciled, with the intended objective of the law to create a reporting func-
tion to provide public information as to the general state of a company’s
affairs, and in particular the company’s financial position.
The insistence by the court inMwila that the statutory consequences for fail-
ure to register only “apply to companies and not to an individual who holds
an equitable mortgage by way of deposit of title deeds” must be treated cau-
tiously because, although the obligation to register rests on the company,
27 Goode Commercial Law, above at note 14 at 651.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. Note that all the UK company law provisions of the 1985, 1989 and 2004 acts have
been consolidated in the Companies Act 2006. At the time of writing, the British govern-
ment had announced that the final implementation date of the Companies Act 2006
would be postponed from 1 October 2008 to 1 October 2009.
30 Goode, ibid.
31 See sec 99(2), Companies Act.
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there are wider implications for creditors in relation to third parties with com-
peting interests. Given that section 99 is aimed at the transactions and not just
the documents in respect of charges envisaged under part V of the Companies
Act and that the law requires both “the particulars and documents relating to
a charge … to be lodged with the Registrar”,32 it is important to note that the
particulars or a copy of the security document are only required to be lodged
“if the charge is created or evidenced by an instrument”.33 Also, the definition
of the word “charge” includes mortgages34 and covers “a[ny] charge on land”.35
Without having regard to particular circumstances, it may therefore not be
entirely accurate to suggest unequivocally that an equitable mortgage by sur-
render of title deeds is not registrable. These circumstances may include the
existence of a memorandum of deposit or surrender of title deeds, in which
case the transaction would be evidenced by an instrument. The absence of
such evidence would presumably give rise to a different outcome. It is not
unlikely that this was the gravamen of the reason for the decision in Mwila.
The terms of section 99 are clear as to the consequences for non-registration,
and also regarding the requirement for particulars, not just documents, to be
lodged. In principle, it is unusual to require registration of a possessory security.
The physical possession of a document of title by the creditor is considered to be
the strongest form of perfecting the creditor’s security interest; registration is
thought to be unnecessary since the absence of the deeds puts third parties
dealing with the debtor on inquiry. On the other hand, registration of a posses-
sory security may offer peremptory protection for those taking that security,
particularly in the case where fake documents of title may be involved. The
act, therefore, appropriately provides a voluntary registration scheme under
section 99(10) which allows for “lodgement of documents… on the application
of any person interested in the charge”.36 However, when the law invites the
conclusion that registration is more than just a matter of perfection, but also
affects validity, there is little comfort in the provision of voluntary registration
as an option for the chargee. This is because, through no fault of their own,
creditors face the daunting prospect that a charge under which they have
taken security may be deprived of priority or worse still be voided.
32 Id, sec 99(11).
33 Ibid. Subsec (2) contains the actual requirement obliging companies to register, while
subsec (3) stipulates the particulars required for the purposes of registration.
34 Id, sec 2.
35 See id, sec 99(1)(e). Note that subsec (6) provides: “Debentures entitling the holder to a
charge on land shall for the purposes of this section be deemed not to be an interest
in land.” Sec 395 of the UK Companies Act 1985 creates similar mandatory registration
requirements for charges by companies created by the deposit of title deeds.
36 According to sec 99(10), “that person shall be entitled to recover from the company the
amount of any fees properly paid by him to the Registrar on the lodgement”. The docu-
ments for this purpose include the prescribed form for particulars as required by sec 99
(3) and particulars or copies of the instrument creating or evidencing the charge.
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PRIORITIES
Creditors taking security must make a point of establishing by due diligence
that there are no pre-existing interests to which their own security will be sub-
ordinated. They also need to take appropriate measures to perfect their secur-
ity interest to avoid it being overridden by a debtor’s subsequent disposition.
While subordination to competing security interests may not be fatal, the
existence of an absolute superior opposing interest extinguishes the security
interest altogether.37
Common law and equity38
The general rule established through case law is that priority among compet-
ing interests is determined by the order in which they were created, provided
that a legal estate has preference over an equitable interest.39 Generally, where
there are competing equitable interests, the first in time prevails.40 As Lord
Macnaghten said, “[i]t is the essence of … a [floating] charge that it remains
dormant until the undertaking charged ceases to be a going concern”.41
Thus, since a “floating charge is merely an incomplete charge until it crystal-
lizes any later fixed legal or equitable charge created by the company - even in
favour of a person who has actual notice of the floating charge - will rank in
priority unless the floating charge had crystallized and the later chargee had
notice of crystallization before the later charge was created”.42 Where a sub-
sequent floating charge is created over identical assets, it will be ineffective
37 For more analysis, see Goode Commercial Law, above at note 14 at 51.
38 The common law and the doctrines of equity are applicable in Zambia subject to the
provisions of the constitution and any other written law. See English Law (Extent of
Application) Act, cap 11 of the Laws of Zambia, sec 2(a) and (b).
39 This is in keeping with the maxim that “where the equities are equal, the law prevails”.
40 Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1 [1824–834] All ER 28. This case established a controversial
English common law rule to determine priority between competing equitable claims
to the same asset. The beneficial owners of a trust of land mortgaged their beneficial
interest to two different mortgagees. The question arose as to which mortgage had pri-
ority. It was held that the deciding factor was the order in which the mortgages had been
notified to the trustees, regardless of the order in which the mortgage was granted. This
is provided that the holder of the subsequent interest takes title without notice of the
first interest, in which case the former obtains priority. It was subsequently extended
to all assignments of a beneficial interest by sec 137 of the UK Law of Property Act
1925. The rule has been severely criticized. For example, see Lord Macnaghten in Ward
v Duncombe [1893] AC 369, stating [at 393]: “I am inclined to think that the rule in
Dearle v Hall has on the whole produced at least as much injustice as it has prevented”;
see also F Oditah Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (1991, Sweet & Maxwell); Goode
Commercial Law, above at note 14 at 652, stating that “[i]t is high time that the rule in
Dearle v Hall was abolished”.
41 Per Lord Macnaghten in Governments Stock and Other Securities Investment Co Ltd v Manila
Pty Co (1897) AC 81 at 86.
42 Lingard Bank Security Documents, above at note 10 at 156 and 159; Re Hamilton’s Windor
Ironworks, ex p Pitman and Edwards (1879) 12 Ch D 707. Also, see Goode Commercial Law,
above at note 14 at 686, stating (at 665): “The peculiarity of the floating charge is that,
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in relation to the existing floating charge if it goes against the intention of the
earlier charge.43 This position is not founded on the existence of a negative
pledge clause in the security document. However, the company may create a
prior ranking floating charge over part of the assets.44 Here, the specificity
of the charge and not that of its subject matter will influence priorities.45
These rules have a different application where the floating charge has a
negative pledge clause against the creation of higher ranking charges, pro-
vided the affected third party had notice of the pledge.46 Still, not all those
taking with notice of the security interest are necessarily affected by it.47 It
is now conventional wisdom in legal drafting to include such a restriction
in debentures without which the floating charge would be virtually useless.
The bona fide holder of a later legal charge still has priority over an earlier
equitable charge as long as they are without notice. Similarly, where a floating
charge contains a clause restricting or prohibiting prior or equal ranking, a
subsequent fixed chargee or mortgagee shall still have priority provided
they had no notice of the restrictive covenant.48 Mere registration of the float-
ing charge does not constitute notice that it contains a clause with a negative
pledge.49 In any event, notice of a debenture is not necessarily notice of its
contents.50
There are further considerations where one of the conflicting charges is
created by mortgage, as was the case inMwila. The rules of priority with regard
to mortgages were changed following the introduction of the UK Law of
Property Act 1925 (LPA). Briefly, where the mortgages fall in the same class,
for example if both are equitable mortgages, the first in time will have
priority. This is so because “where the equities are equal, the law prevails”,
and here the old rule that the first in time has priority prevails.51 However,
under the LPA no distinction is made between legal or equitable mortgages.
The question is whether the mortgage is registrable as a land charge.
contd
by virtue of the powers of disposition left to the debtor company, it is in principle sub-
ordinated to a subsequent fixed charge, whether legal or equitable”.
43 Re Benjamin Cope & Sons Ltd, Marshall v Benjamin Cope & Sons Ltd [1914] 1 Ch 800; Re
Household Products Co Ltd (1981) 124 DLR (3d) 325.
44 Re Automatic Bottle Makers Ltd, Osborne v Automatic Bottle Makers (1926) Ch 412.
45 JH Farrar, NE Furey and BM Hannigan Farrar’s Company Law (3rd ed, 1991, Butterworths)
at 277.
46 Goode Commercial Law, above at note 14 at 686–87.
47 Id at 666.
48 Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1; Wheatley v Silkstone & Haigh Moor Coal Co (1885) 29 Ch D 715.
49 Under sec 24 of the Companies Act, notice or knowledge of the contents of a document
concerning a company is not to be presumed by reason only that the document has
been lodged at the Companies Registry or is held by the company and available for
inspection. Also, see Re Valletort Sanitary Steam Laundry Co Ltd, Ward v Valletort Sanitary
Steam Laundry Co Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 654; Re Standard Rotary Machine Co (1906) 95 LT 829.
50 Halsbury’s Laws of England, above at note 7, vol 16, para 1327.
51 R Megarry and HWR Wade The Law of Real Property (4th ed, 1977, Stevens & Sons) at 959.
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If registration is required but has not been done, then priority is lost over a
subsequent encumbrancer and, indeed, the mortgage is void against a later
purchaser.52 Mortgages that are not required to be registered, such as those
created by deposit of documents of title, do not come under this statutory
regime and their priority is governed by the rules applicable before the intro-
duction of the LPA.53 This was the reasoning adopted in Mwila. Although the
court did not establish a basis for the applicability or relevance of the LPA to
Zambia, a similar outcome would presumably be achieved provided the
mortgage in question was not “created or evidenced by an instrument”.
Statutory scheme
Section 101 of the Companies Act sought to change the normal rules for deter-
mining priority in cases where there was conflict. The Companies Act created
ten categories of charges which require registration.54 These categories refer to
specific kinds of assets in respect of which security can be taken. For those
charges that fall within the types required to be registered, the rank of priority
is determined and guaranteed according to the time of registration. Where
there is conflict between competing rights holders, the first to file prevails.
Since in this case the time of lodgement at the Companies Registry establishes
the point of priority, the date of creation of the security is irrelevant. If the
charges involved are of the kind required to be registered under the
Companies Act, their nature or characterization is also irrelevant for the pur-
poses of determining priority. In essence, whether a charge is required to be
registered depends on the kind of property being charged, ie the type of
asset must be stipulated in one of the ten statutory categories.
Where the charges do not come within the scope of section 101, the rule in
that section does not apply. Also, the rule will clearly not apply where there
are special rules of priority set out in another statute.55 If a charge, other
than a floating charge, gives security over company property that is of a
kind envisaged under part V, and also over other property (for which regis-
tration is not required), the applicable point of priority will be the time
of registration for the former but not for the latter.56 For other property
not covered by section 101, the common law rules will apply. Hence, a charge
or entitlement which is otherwise not registrable, and presumably stronger,
will not lose priority. In other words, mere registration of a floating charge
will not oust the priority of a later fixed legal or equitable charge provided
the latter does not fall within the ambit of section 99(1).
In Mwila, the security held by equitable mortgage was created before the
floating charge (which was duly registered), and long before the appointment
52 Id at 970.
53 Id at 969.
54 Companies Act, sec 99(11).
55 Id, sec 99(2).
56 Id, sec 99(3).
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of a receiver under the charge.57 Although the latter was merely an equitable
security before the crystallizing event, the equities were not equal since the
former was fixed. The court therefore held that the mortgage had maintained
its priority status over the floating charge. In any event, the surrender of title
deeds occurred before the charge was created.
The holding of the Supreme Court to the effect that an equitable mortgage by
deposit of title deeds did not lose priority to a floating charge which was duly
registered warrants further comment. The court opined that sections 99 and
101 did not apply to an equitable mortgage by way of deposit of title deeds
held by an individual. It stated in particular that section 101 is self-explanatory
in creating priority by registration only among those charges required to be
registered under part V of the Companies Act. It must be reiterated here that
the point is not so much that the chargee is an individual, but whether the
charge is of the kind that is required to be registered. The equitable mortgage
was not registrable as there was no document to register and, in any event, if
there was anything to register it was the company’s responsibility to do so. The
consequences for non-registration, vis-à-vis validity or priority, are not vitiated
by the mere fact that the obligation to register rests with the debtor company.
If indeed the requirement for registration captures both charge documents
and particulars, then one would argue that any transaction which involves the
creation of a charge over the property or undertaking of a company falling
within the purview of section 99(1) is subject to those requirements. In
Mwila, it was made clear that the individual chargee held his interest
“under a loan agreement which was secured by equitable mortgage by way
of deposit of the Title Deeds”.58 One is left to wonder whether this agreement
was not reduced to writing, thereby satisfying the statutory prescription that
“if the charge is created or evidenced by an instrument”59 then registration
is required. With regard to the rules for determining priority involving mort-
gages, it will suffice to note that the exemption which applies to security by
deposit of title deeds under the LPA refers to charges over unregistered
land. It is because the land is unregistered that the charge is deemed to be
protected through the surrender of the title deeds. Assuming for the sake of
argument that the LPA were applicable to Zambia, it is important to bear in
mind that the definition of the word “charge” includes mortgages and that
registration is required for “a charge on land”.60 Although the court dwelt
57 Note that the decision in Re Sapco (above at note 3) is inconsistent with the superior
precedent in Mwila on the applicability of the common law rules.
58 Mwila, above at note 5.
59 Companies Act, sec 99(11). The word “instrument” must obviously be taken to mean a
“legal instrument”, in which case it refers to any document, however duly executed
and authenticated, for the purpose of stating some contractual relationship or granting
some right. EA Martin and J Law (eds) A Dictionary of Law (6th ed, 2006, Oxford UP) at 279
define an “instrument” as “a formal document, such as a will, deed, or conveyance,
which is evidence of [for example] rights and duties”.
60 See Companies Act secs 2 and 99(1)(e) respectively. Sec 2 of the Land and Deeds Registry
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on the issue, it did not point to any basis to suggest that this UK statute is in
force in Zambia. In the absence of such validation, the applicable rules would
be those existing at common law before the changes introduced by the UK
statute, subject of course to the provisions of the Companies Act.61
CONCLUSION
This article has discussed the nature of the legal requirements for registration
of company charges under the Zambian Companies Act. There seems to be a
lack of conceptual symmetry between the registrability criteria and the sanc-
tions for failure to register, vis-à-vis the objectives of registration. This raises
concerns and some doubt as to the suitability of the statutory scheme.62
While registration assures priority, it clearly also serves to protect the security
from being void against subsequent encumbrances.63 Thus, it is ultimately the
creditors’ responsibility to act diligently to secure their interests. There can be
little doubt that charges are important business devices. As Goode has
observed, “[t]he purpose of the floating charge has always been to provide
the creditor with some form of security interest, despite the debtor’s dealing
powers, while ensuring that third parties acquiring rights in the subject mat-
ter of the charge obtain a title free from the floating charge”.64 However, a
clear set of rules for determining priority is important for maintaining a bal-
ance between the interests of the debtor company to deal with its assets in the
ordinary course of business, and the interests and competing rights of credi-
tors. These rules have historically depended on the courts’ characterization
of charges but this has caused difficulties in relation to the rights of preferen-
tial creditors. The introduction of a statutory registration scheme was meant
to address some of these problems by simplifying the rules on priority.
Therefore, the law can scarcely afford to be confounded by judicial precedent.
If nothing else, the need to preserve the law’s original objectives, in seeking to
create a suitable statutory scheme, would be sufficient reason for further
review and reform.
contd
Act (cap 185) provides that a “mortgage includes a deposit of title deeds or documents
with the object of creating an equitable mortgage on the property comprised in such
deeds or documents and any charge”.
61 The argument can be framed differently by arguing that the applicable rules are the
pre-1925 rules in any event, since the exemption relating to security by deposit of title
deeds only applies to charges over unregistered land.
62 See Goode Commercial Law, above at note 14 at 689.
63 Companies Act, sec 99(11)(a).
64 Goode Commercial Law, above at note 14 at 689.
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